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Intro: do we need a conceptual framework? 
During the forty or so years that I have been studying history, my main interest has always 
been in cultural history. To me this means trying to comprehend changes in how people see 
the world and themselves, and how they communicate and discuss their thoughts and feelings. 
Within that huge field, I was most interested in how people reacted to, and interpreted new 
technologies, especially the big innovations, which many believed would change the world: 
steam, electricity, nuclear power, computers. Most of my work is about the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
Reading cultural history has been fascinating and frustrating at the same time. 
Fascinating, because such great books and articles have been written about it, but frustrating 
as well, because when I tried to learn from them how to practice this type of history, most of 
these works offered only very vague suggestions. When imagining a conversation in which I 
put this question to my favourite authors, they seemed to reply: just read as much as you can 
about your subject, immerse yourself in the sources; when reflecting on your reading, you will 
start to see patterns; make these patterns the core of your article or book; illustrate your story 
with the most telling quotations and the best examples, episodes, etc. that you have found. I 
use the word ‘story’ on purpose here, because I see these colleagues as first of all storytellers 
– and some of them are really outstanding ones.  
A typical example is Paul Boyer’s book about early reactions to nuclear weapons in 
the US, By the bomb’s early light. The book is based on a massive amount of sources, 
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especially popular media, and it is very well written. But nowhere does Boyer explain how he 
selected his sources, what method he used in analysing them, and he tells you little about 
possible different interpretations and why he has chosen one explanation rather than another. 
He essentially tells a story, based on a couple of theses and narrative lines, which he 
illustrates with a mass of good examples. You tend to believe him because of his enormous 
erudition as well as the charm of his style – but afterwards you might think, as I did: what if 
you use a different set of sources, or if you find some of Boyer’s sources more or less 
important than he does? When I am in a more grumpy mood, I find such books overwhelming 
in detail, and impressionistic, even arbitrary, in their interpretation. This kind of criticism is 
applicable to many great books in cultural history, not just about technology. I am thinking 
about Keith Thomas’ work on religion, for example, or Alain Corbin’s The lure of the sea. 
And for cultural history of technology I had a similar experience with Joseph Corn’s The 
winged gospel, the recent book by Ronald Kline on cybernetics, and even David Nye’s 
analysis of American technological narratives, although Nye’s work is more theoretically 
informed (I’ll come back to him). These authors hardly use the theories and methods 
developed in, for example, the sociology of science and technology, popularization theory, 
concepts of narrative analysis, cultural anthropological approaches, etc; we even don’t see 
much explicit old-fashioned historical source criticism here. And they typically make big 
statements about what ‘people,  ‘most people,’ or ‘many people’ thought or felt, offering as 
evidence only a few quotations and a lot of references in the footnotes – which, to me, is more 
suggestive than persuasive. 
Please note that I am not talking of minor works, but about books that are highly 
regarded in the history of technology community, and that I admire myself as well. I also 
hasten to add that several historians of technology have paid a lot of attention to theory, 
including cultural theory – the American Paul Edwards is a great example for me; so is the 
Swiss historian Sarasin; or the German historian Martina Hessler. Hessler, by the way, 
recently published a Kulturgeschichte der Technik: an overview that I highly recommend 
(don’t forget to read the historiographical overview she wrote as an additional chapter, and 
which is freely available on the internet).1 In short: I am not saying that no one is bothering 
1 A few rather arbitrary examples from my own reading: P. Edwards, The closed world. Computers and the 
politics of discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 1997); A.W. Daum, 
Wissenschaftspopularisierung im 19. Jahrhundert. Bürgerliche Kultur, naturwissenschaftliche Bildug und die 
deutsche Öffentlichkeit 1848-1914 (München: Oldenbourg 2002, 2d ed.); Ph. Sarasin, Geschichtswissenschaft 
und Diskursanalyse (Frankfurt a/M; Suhrkamp 2003); Anne-Katrin Ebert, Radelnde Nationen. Die Geschichte des 
Fahrrads in Deutschland und den Niederlanden (Frankfurt: Campus 2010); M. Hard, A. Jamison, Hubris and 
hybrids. A cultural history of technology and science (NY, London: Routledge2005); M. Hessler, Kulturgeschichte 
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with theory in this field, but I am surprised that so many seem to be doing happily without, 
and without getting much criticism.  
If so many good books are written with so little attention to theory, why would you 
take the trouble of constructing a theoretical and methodological framework? I think there are 
two main reasons. First, theory sharpens your perception: you will see connections that you 
otherwise might miss. And second, if you want to work with others, for example in a 
comparative or transnational project, you simply have to agree with your co-authors on what 
kinds of sources to use, which questions to ask, and what methods to employ, in order to build 
up a coherent interpretation together. And by explicitly stating your theoretical point of view 
and your methods, you invite discussion with your colleagues, which may lead to 
improvement of these methods.  
In this lecture, I will explain the framework I have developed. It is only one of many 
possible approaches which you might consider to use in your own work. In the first part, I will 
set out the theoretical flagpoles, in the second, I will try to demonstrate their usefulness with 
some examples from my own research. 
 
Symbol sphere 
In the seventies, as a student, I eagerly read CharlesWright Mills’ The sociological 
imagination. I was especially inspired by the final chapter, in which he explains his method. 
To get a better understanding of his approach, I then read the large theoretical work he had 
written earlier, together with the German sociologist Hans Gerth, Character and social 
structure (1954). This book provided a comprehensive conceptual framework for analyzing 
any society, in all its aspects, and in all phases of human history. It seemed to offer a key to a 
historian like me, who was interested in a structural approach to history. The book 
disappointed me, however – and probably others as well, for you will find few references to it 
(see Jstor, Muse, web of science, scopus, google scholar). 
But, as happens sometimes, one phrase of Gerth and Mills had stuck in my head: 
“symbol spheres” (plural). This concept has not caught on either (see the same search 
engines), but to me it is very useful. In fact, it has become my working definition of culture. 
Let me explain.2 
der Technik (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2012); Chr. Neumaier, Dieselautos in Deutschland und den USA. Zum 
Verhältnis von Technologie, Konsum und Politik, 1949-2005 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 2010). 
2 The literature on cultural analysis is, of course, huge, and it is part of several academic disciplines, each with 
its own conceptual toolbox and theoretical repertoire. Therefore, one can be grateful to those erudite and 
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First, symbols are forms of what semiologists call ‘signs,’ commonly understood 
means of designating objects and experiences, which can be combined in myriad ways to 
create messages, in the form of sentences, stories, images, songs. They are, in other words, 
vehicles of communication, which I consider to be the core of culture (more of that in a 
moment). Second, although Gerth and Mills speak mainly of language, ‘symbols’ can also 
refer to images and even to ‘body language,’ because these are all ‘signs,’ which are used to 
convey meaning. ‘Symbol sphere’ therefore invites a broad approach of culture, and the use 
of a wide range of sources. And finally, while Gerth and Mills emphasize cognitive and 
normative aspects, symbols also convey feelings, hunches, and intuitions, which are obviously 
very important in reactions to technologies. 
The second part of Gerth and Mills’ term is ‘sphere.’ This suggests that culture is an 
environment. I think of culture as one of several aspects of the world that surrounds us, and 
which includes, besides symbols: nature, artefacts, social arrangements and institutions. This 
view of culture differs from the more common one, in which symbols are assumed to be 
expressions of ideas which reside inside our heads. In this view, culture is basically a 
psychological, or ‘inner’ phenomenon. This implies that we can study culture only indirectly, 
through the outward manifestations in which these ‘inner worlds’ of experience are expressed. 
James Carey is one of many thinkers who disagrees with that view. He insists that  
 
‘Thought is predominantly public and social. It occurs primarily on blackboards, in 
dances, and in recited poems. The capacity of private thought is a derived and 
secondary talent, one that appears biographically later in the person and historically 
later in the species.’  
 
And: ‘Our attempts to construct, maintain, repair, and transform reality are publicly 
observable activities that occur in historical time.’3  
 
eloquent scholars who can guide us through all this work and help us choose the tools we need for our own 
research. I suggest just three books that I have found extremely helpful, as well as enjoyable; for more 
references, you can start with the bibliographies of these books. J. Fiske, Introduction to communication studies 
(London, NY: Routledge 1990 2nd ed. Oorspr 1982); U. Daniel, Kompendium Kulturgeschichte. Theorien, Praxis, 
Schlüsselwörter (Frankfurt 2004, 4e verbesserte Auflage. 1st ed 2001); and Hessler’s overview, quoted above. 
More specific works are quoted elsewhere in this lecture. 
3 Carey, ‘A cultural approach to communication’ in J.W. Carey, Communication as culture (New York: Routledge 
2009, 2d revised edition, with foreword by H. Stuart Adam), 22, 25. 
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The cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, too, wrote that ‘human thought [is] a public, and 
not, or at least not fundamentally, a private activity.’ He spoke of an ‘extrinsic theory’ of 
thought. He argued that the cultural patterns we learn are so important, because humans are 
the least programmed creatures in the world. They learn because their instincts cannot 
sufficiently guide them. And this learning process, fortunately for us historians, leaves traces 
in the sources.4 
Many other scholars agree. Just one more example. In 1972 the American philosopher 
Hubert Dreyfus wrote a withering critique of Artificial Intelligence research, because he 
believed that AI is based on a fundamental mistake: the idea that intelligence is located inside 
the brain – a human or an artificial one. Dreyfus argued that intelligence is not only located 
inside human minds, but also in the environment that men and women have created, and in 
their practices:  
 
‘Intelligence is nothing other than the overall interactive and interdependent structure 
of meaningful behaviour and objects.’5  
 
For the cultural historian this is, of course, a pleasant point of view, for we can only really 
study the visible or public part of culture. The thoughts and feelings inside our heads are not 
only invisible to others, they are also ephemeral, even inscrutable to ourselves, and they leave 
only very partial traces in the sources – as in a diary entry about a dream you had: the words 
capture only a distorted fragment of the dream’s rich colours, shapes and sounds, which are 
lost forever after you have woken up.  
4 Clifford Geertz, ‘Religion as a cultural system’ and ‘Ideology as a cultural system,’ both in idem, The 
interpretation of cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) esp 95-96 and section V of the ideology essay (213ff). 
The philosopher Gilbert Ryle’s The concept of mind was an important reference for Geertz. Here are some more 
examples of this ‘external’ view of culture. Goethe says in his autobiography that when he is alone he imagines 
being in conversation with others; even solitary thought was a social process to him! (see Goethe’s Dichtung 
und Wahrheit, 13th book, where he explains how he came to write Das leiden des jungen Werthers; see the 
Insel-edition, volume II, pp 640-641). Neurologist Oliver Sacks says something very similar about another 
seemingly private phenomenon: personal memories (New York Review of Books, 21 febr 2013). Not all our 
gurus agree, however. The great linguist Noam Chomsky believes that in human evolution, language as an 
instrument of thought precedes its use for communication. See the fascinating review of his latest book with 
Robert Berwick in New York Review of Books, 18 August 2016, by Ian Tattersall (I look forward to reactions to 
this review, which will probably be published there later this year). I am entirely incompetent to judge between 
these positions. My choice for culture as a public phenomenon is a pragmatic one, although it is nice that some 
great thinkers will back it up with theory and evidence. 
5 J. Haugeland, ‘Body and World: a review of H.L. Dreyfus, What computers still can’t do: a critique of artificial 
reason (Cambrdige, MA: MIT Press 1992)’, Artificial intelligence 80 (1996), 119-128.  
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 If culture is an environment that consists of symbols, it is a dynamic environment, a 
process of communication – because that is what symbols are for. James Carey liked to quote 
Kenneth Burke, who compared culture to an unending conversation, going on in a parlour. 
When you have become old enough to enter the parlour and begin to understand what the 
people around you are talking about, you join the conversation. You leave it when you die, 
but the discussion goes on and on.6 Historian of technology David Nye has extended this idea 
to technology – not just discussions about technology:  
 
‘Overall, I take technology to be part of an ongoing conversation between generations 
and between social groups over their differing conceptions of what is desirable, 
possible, or even real.’ 
And: ‘Technologies are part of a dialogue between human beings about their different 
perceptions. This dialogue takes the form of narratives, different stories we tell each 
other to make sense of the transformations that accompany the adoption of new 
machines.’7 
 
It is important to add that the conversation which is culture is not always a peaceful one, as 
the parlour metaphor suggests. Culture is also a theatre of conflict, of hegemonial ideas versus 
suppressed ones. Maybe we should think of ‘conversation’ as the more civilised part of 
culture, and recognise that there is another part where bitter conflicts are fought out – areas of 
violence. In any case, we need to take into account that culture is always enmeshed with 
relations of power. We cannot study culture apart from politics and the economy.8  
This brings me to the question of how the symbol sphere is related to other aspects of 
our environment: to nature, artefacts and institutions. This relates, of course, to the long 
debate about materialism and idealism. Carey, for example, is clearly an idealist. He argues 
that, as the Gospel of John says, ‘in the beginning was the word’: we live in the world we 
create in a process of constant conversation. David Nye would probably agree. Postmodernist 
6 See Stuart Adam’s introduction to the 2009 edition of Communication as culture. Burke’s famous ‘parlor 
metaphor’ is in his The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action. 
7 David E. Nye, Narratives and spaces. Technology and the construction of American culture (Exeter: University 
of Exeter Press), 3. The notion of culture as dialogue was developed in the early twentieth century by American 
thinkers such as C.H. Cooley. See D.J. Czitrom, Media and the American mind (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press 1982), chapter 4, esp 96, 98. 
8 I owe this important addition to a remark, in the discussion after my talk, by one of the tutors, Jaume 
Valentines-Alvarez, who said we needed a dose of Gramsci, in addition to Habermas. 
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thinkers have elaborated this idea excessively, in my opinion.9 But we need not go into that: 
most historians have more or less ignored the debate on postmodernism, because they are 
interested in more specific questions; or because, as we saw at the beginning of this lecture, 
they are not interested in theory at all. Thus we have, for example, marvellous studies about 
how certain ideals of modern living and gender relations inspired the design of the Frankfurter 
Kitchen during the 1920, which in turn became the model for most kitchens afterwards. The 
physical organization of these kitchens then influenced the daily lives of millions of women 
and their families. Historians and sociologists have used the term ‘script’ to describe this 
process: a word that nicely connects ideas (a script has to be ‘written’) and behaviour (a script 
prescribes action – although the human actor may deviate from it).10 Other studies show how 
different attitudes towards authorities that were dominant in countries such as France, 
Germany and Britain shaped the very different reactions to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.11 
In this recent research, the subject matter of cultural history tends to become very broadly 
defined, more or less as social history was when I was a student in the 1970s. Raymond 
Williams is often quoted, who in the 1950s defined culture as ‘a whole way of life’ – that is: 
our work, daily habits, power relations, etc. – in all of those areas, of course, technology plays 
a role. 
My own research focuses upon a narrower, perhaps more traditional aspect of culture: 
the way people come to see the world. I try to understand the process of human 
understanding, as it manifests itself in an ongoing conversation. My goal is not to understand 
the making and uses of technology. If you would tell me that therefore my research is not 
about history of technology at all, I would not complain (and that is why I did not call this talk 
‘cultural history OF technology’). The making and using of technology are not what I attempt 
to understand. Yet, technology plays a central role in my research, because of its enormous 
presence in 20th century societies, not only in the economy, in daily life, and in military 
power, but also in people’s awareness of themselves and of the world, their fears and hopes 
9 Carey, ‘Cultural approach’, 22. Ernest Gellner has answered the postmodernist core idea nicely and briefly: 
‘concepts do constitute a social constraint; but not all social constraints are conceptual,’ in E. Gellner, Plough, 
sword, and book. The structure of human history (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989), 14-15. See also 
the excellent critical discussion in U. Daniel, Kompendium Kulturgeschichte o.c. 
10 E.g. Martina Hessler, ‘The Frankfurt kitchen: the model of modernity and the “madness” of traditional users, 
1926 to 1933’ in R. Oldenziel, K. Zachmann (eds), Cold war kitchen. Americanization, technology, and European 
users (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009), 158-178. This is one example of a now very large literature on the 
‘social construction of technology.’ See Hessler’s overview, o.c. 
11 Karena Kalmbach, Meanings of a disaster: the contested ‘truth’ about Chernobyl. British and French 
Chernobyl debates and the transnationality of arguments and actors  
(PhD thesis, European University, Florence, 2014). 
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If culture consists of conversations, frequently with technology as a prominent topic, how can 
we analyse these conversations? David Nye and the psychologist Jerome Bruner say: by 
studying the stories people tell each other and themselves. Why stories? Bruner gives a very 
general answer. Stories, he says, are the most basic way we understand the world. As in much 
narrative theory12, he uses a broad definition of story. It includes stories we tell and listen to 
in daily life: a student explaining why he is late in class, what you tell your partner about 
meeting your neighbour in the street, who told you of her recent visit to the hospital; or how a 
refugee tells you about crossing the sea in a leaking boat at night and being picked up by a 
coast guard. Fiction and non-fiction may blur in such stories of course, especially if they have 
the purpose of convincing an audience – say the teacher who listens to a student who comes in 
late, or the lonely neighbour who needs a listening ear, or the Syrian who tries to make the 
authorities give him a refugee status. These are all stories, because they contain action 
unfolding in time and in a certain setting, with actors having certain motives and goals.13 
Even such daily storytelling may draw on literary genres, like the adventure story or the 
conflict of generations. And we model the stories we tell each other and ourselves on the ones 
we are familiar with: the fairy tales that were read to us when they were children, or the 
adventures of people in tv serials, which themselves follow ancient models. 
The basic reason why stories are so powerful is that they give us a sense of order, and 
at the same time show us what may happen when this order is disturbed. The order is usually 
presented at the beginning of the story, where we enter its fictional world. It may be far away 
or long ago, or very close to home, as long as the listener or reader recognizes it as an ordered 
human situation. Then something unexpected happens, the order is disturbed, perhaps 
seriously deranged.14 That is the start of story. 
 
12 From, again, a flood of titles, I recommend Luc Herman, Bart Vervaeck, Handbook of narrative analysis 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2005); and the older but still very useful R. Wellek, A. Warren, 
Theory of literature (Penguin 1980, 1st ed 1949). 
13 See Kenneth Burke’s pentad, quoted in Bruner, Making stories, 34. Bruner demonstrates how psychologists’ 
notions about self correspond very neatly with basic elements of a story: 70-72. 
14 Bruner says that we are hard-wired that way: we seek the routine and the reassuring, but our nervous 
system is always alert to the unexpected, and part of us is always eager for adventure, danger. 
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Here are two examples. In Tobias Wolff’s short story ‘Say yes,’ a husband and a wife are 
doing the dishes, a daily routine they have apparently shared for a very long time.15 They chat 
about this and that. Their conversation then turns to the question if black people should marry 
white people. The man says they shouldn’t, the wife disagrees. Suddenly the conversation 
becomes very sharp, when the wife asks: if I had been black, would you not have married me? 
The situation turns into a small marital crisis, and at the end there is a glimpse, but no more, of 
reconciliation in the bedroom: the relationship has become as uncertain as it was when the 
couple had just met. Stories in popular media usually turn to more spectacular material than 
this domestic scene. The tv series Star Trek, for example, always starts in the high tech 
environment of the starship Enterprise with its crew, which become very familiar to the viewer 
after a few episodes. Then a stranger comes on board, the situation is disturbed, disaster 




In a fundamental way, technology is a perfect case of ‘the dialectic of the established and the 
possible.’ Think of the Manhattan Project in World War II: a very goal-directed and well 
organized project, involving several well-established organizations, such as universities, large 
companies, and state-financed research institutes. All these people and organizations worked 
according to well-established practices of scientific discovery and technological invention. On 
15 A film-version of this story is available on youtube. I found it disappointing: the couple are glamorous young 
actors instead of the older, homey couple that I think Wolff had in mind. 
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the other hand, they worked at the frontiers of the possible and created new things, with 
consequences that could mostly not be foreseen – in this case, nuclear power. This dialectic 
can well be represented in stories where something unforeseen happens in some everyday 
situation that we recognise as our own.  
 Let’s expand this idea a little. The world we find ourselves in presupposes a lot of 
implicit trust: to fall asleep on an airplane, say, or to trust the pills your doctor prescribes to 
you. This trust is as routine as our daily use of high tech, it is part of the ‘established order’ in 
which we live. But trust is always accompanied by a subconscious undercurrent of doubt: the 
plane might crash, the doctor might make a mistake, you never know, it is always possible. 
And in our nightmares, the doctor may be an evil character who wants to kill us; or the plane 
might be manipulated by some sinister power. Disaster movies exploit these fears. And 
science fiction literature and movies are full of evil scientists who derange the established 
order – think of Frankenstein, Moreau, Strangelove.16 
One corollary of Bruner’s theory of stories is that, as he says, ‘the sharing of common 
stories creates an interpretive community.’17 In other words, stories that are very popular are 
likely to shape ideas and intuitions about the world that most people in a society share – 
although there will certainly be variations depending on gender, social class, age and so on. 
That is why I am particularly interested in popular culture: it is likely to reflect common ideas, 
a common sense of the established order and common fears of disruption. There is another 
reason for that: popular magazines, comics and films are usually made for profit. The people 
who produce them do all they can to make them attractive for as many people as possible. 
‘The sharing of common stories’ does not mean that many people read exactly the same 
comic books or see the same movies. The important thing is the deep structures in these 
stories: if many stories have the same basic structure, that structure will tend to shape a 
similar point of view in most of the readers or viewers.18 
16 A. Giddens, The consequences of modernity (Cambridge: Polity 1990), 88-90; M. Berman, All that is solid 
melts into air. The experience of modernity (NY: Viking Penguin 1988; 1st ed 1982), 15. A beautiful book on trust 
is Geoffrey Hosking, Trust. A history (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), but he does not write about 
technology. On images of scientists: R. Haynes, From Faust to Strangelove. Representations of the scientist in 
western literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 1994); Philip Sarasin, ‚Das obszöne Geniessen der Wissenschaft. 
Über Popularwissenschaft und “mad scientists”‘, in Sarasin, Geschichtswissenschaft, o.c., 231-257; and many 
others. 
17 Bruner, Making stories, 25. 
18 Or reflect a common point of view? Perhaps impossible to distinguish the two; but Bruner’s formulation, and 
that of Carey too, tends towards shaping. This is another classical, unresolved and probably unresolvable, 
dilemma. 
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So how do we find these structures? Well, another advantage of studying culture as 
storytelling is that we can use the large toolbox of narrative analysis, created by generations 
of literary scholars and anthropologists. One problem is that this toolbox is so big, so rich. 
You can spend your whole life studying it – but since you need to get on with your empirical 
work, you have to make some drastic choices. I myself have chosen to work with just a few 
tools from this big box: 
 
- Following Levi-Strauss, I am looking for the oppositions which form the basic 
structure  of a story. For example: what exactly are the characteristics of the utopia or 
dystopia that await us as a consequence of new technologies? What are the 
characteristics of the good guys and the bad guys in a science fiction story? In my 
research, I was surprised to find how frequently the opposition between male and 
female occurred in stories about new technologies.  
- I also look for recurring metaphors. In the debate about nuclear power in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, for example, it was often said that mankind was ‘at the 
threshold’ of a new era, or ‘at a crossroads.’ Propagandists of nuclear power liked the 
image of swords being turned into ploughshares. Metaphors add emotional power, 
suggest attributes without mentioning them, and make the complicated seem more 
understandable. They are attempts to push your thoughts in a certain direction. The 
physicist Edward Teller’s use of the ploughshares image suggested that peaceful uses 
of nuclear power replaced weapons. This was obviously false, but it served his 
purposes. Another nice example is an article I found in the company newspaper of the 
Dutch Philips Electronics company, in the 1960s, about the work of a computer 
operator. The article was kind of advertisement for this new kind of work, which 
probably was rather boring. The article compared the operator to a master organ 
player; and in an interview with one operator, this guy compared the computer to an 
animal whose moods and whims one had get acquainted with in order to tame it. 
These images created a picture of a man in charge, and the artistic and organic 
metaphors tried to impart a counter-image to that of the ‘cog-in-the-machine’, of 
boredom and repetition that was common at the time.19 These examples show the 
importance of interests and power relations in communication, which I mentioned 
earlier. 
19 Philips Koerier, 12 juni 1965. 
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- Finally, I search for metonyms, by which a complicated phenomenon is represented 
by a more easily graspable part of it. This is very common in news reporting and news 
photos. A dramatic example are news photo’s of the destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. From August 1945 Life, the American illustrated weekly magazine, showed 
the famous ‘mushroom cloud,’ which was later repeated after each nuclear test. It also 
showed images of the Japanese cities, reduced to rubble.20 Only in 1952 did it publish 
pictures of the wounded and dead, taken right after the attack by a Japanese 
photographer. This happened after a Japanese magazine had first published these 
photo’s.21 Illustrated magazines in other countries followed the same pattern. 
 
20 Peter Hales claims that the explosion only looked like a mushroom for a few seconds, and these were always 
selected for depiction. He also makes much of the fact the the photo’s appeared in a context of American 
domestic luxury, depicted in advertisements. Thus the Americans became observers at a safe and comfortable 
distance. See P.B. Hales, ‘Imagining the atomic age: Life and the atom’, in E. Doss (ed), Looking at Life magazine 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 2001) . Scott Zeman has demonstrated that the image of nuclear 
weapons was much grimmer, in his ‘To see . . . things dangerous to come to’ in D. van Lente (ed), The nuclear 
age in popular media (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012). 
21 H. Utsumi in Nuclear age, o.c. 






Metonymy is unavoidable in news reporting, esp in news photography. The nuclear 
attack was too complicated to picture in full: the Manhattan Project that had produced 
it, the science and the industrial corporations that were involved, the questionable 
military logic, and the immense suffering it caused. A magazine has to choose which 
image(s) it will use to represent this phenomenon, and it obviously makes a big 
difference which images it chooses. Like metaphor, metonymy pushes our thoughts 
about a large phenomenon in a certain direction – and this can be done in text as well 
as in images. 
 
So, in summary, this is my theoretical framework: 
● Culture is an environment consisting of symbols (‘symbol sphere’); 
● These are used in conversations, which may be peaceful and civilised or more conflictuous; 
14 
 
● Conversations are largely made up of stories; 
● Stories are structured, and their structures can be discovered by looking for oppositions, 
metaphors and metonyms; and by determining the order of the world the story describes, the 
way this order is disturbed, and how and to what extent order is restored; 
● these structures indicate patterns of understanding; they indicate common patterns of 
understanding if they occur frequently in popular media. 
 
Examples  
Most of the following examples are taken from my research about the representation of 
nuclear technologies in popular media.22 Let us begin with Bruner’s notion of ‘the dialectic of 
the established and the possible.’ 
My first example is a comic story series, ‘Blake and Mortimer’, that was very popular in 
the Netherlands during the 1950s through the 1970s. It was created by the Belgian artist Edgar 
Jacobs (it is still in print, by the way). His stories always take place in real locations and the 
action always involved a topic that was much discussed at the time. When reading the first 
pages, you feel like watching a documentary film. Take SOS Metéores (1959). 
 
We are in Paris, Place de l’Opéra, on very rainy day. The newspapers write about the extreme 
weather conditions, floods, and traffic problems, and there is much speculation about the 
causes. Scientists speak of sunspots, many people think it has to do with hydrogen bomb tests. 
In other words, we are in a familiar world that is deeply disturbed and scared. Reading the 
story, we will learn the real causes of the problems. We do this by following the heroes, both 
British: secret agent Blake and scientist Mortimer. This is already a statement, of course: 
22 Dick van Lente (ed), The nuclear age in popular media, o.c. 
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Jacobs tells us that the puzzling and unsettling events we observe in the world are caused by 
things that are hidden from the public eye: international power struggles and secret 
applications of new technologies. 
As the story unfolds, we learn that the weather is being manipulated by some power in the 
East (the Soviet Union is not mentioned explicitly), as a preparation for an attack. This evil 
state employs a brilliant scientist, who has invented a very advanced machinery for changing 
weather conditions. Of course, Blake and Mortimer prevent a victory of this eastern state at 
the last moment.  
The main effect of the story, like all Jacobs’ stories, is reassuring: it emphasizes order, in 
two ways. First, the basic nature of the conflict is the familiar struggle between good and evil. 
The complex structure of science and technology is reduced to two scientists, a good one and 
an evil one. The evil one is always the most intelligent, also in the other stories, but the less 
brilliant Mortimer has moral rectitude and the forces of order on his side, and these are 
victorious in the end.  
Not all popular stories have this reassuring tendency, however. Here is another very 
popular comic, by the Dutch author Marten Toonder. Its two heroes are a gentleman bear, 
Bommel, and his friend, the clever cat Tom Poes.  
 
The starting point of these stories is, as in Blake and Mortimer, a familiar world, this time a 
small town. The inhabitants are mostly animals, but the scenes are immediately familiar: there 
are houses and shops, there are a mayor and policemen, there are entrepreneurs and criminals. 
Trouble often comes with some kind of new technology, as here in Kwetal de breinbaas 
(1950). A strange machine flies over the town, and as in Jacobs’ story, people speculate. 
Some talk of a traveller from Mars, others of a flying saucer, some even of a split atom. When 
the craft has landed in the street, the policeman tries to maintain order by refusing to 
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recognize the strangeness of the phenomenon. He tells the crowd to walk on and keep to the 
right and asks the dwarf who steps out of the craft for his driver’s licence. 
 
 
But the dwarf brings big trouble. He has invented a machine that can make things disappear to 
the fourth dimension. Dangerous events follow, but in the end, Tom Poes puts the dwarf and 
his invention under the ground again, from where they have come. Order is restored, and as in 
all Toonder’s stories, there is a meal to celebrate the happy ending. There is a snag however. 
Just before the final meal, we see Tom Poes read an item in the newspaper to Bommel, about 
the new hydrogen bomb, which had just been announced by Truman, shortly before 
Toonder’s story was serialized in the newspapers. Tom Poes tells his friend that the new 
weapon is very similar to the dwarf’s machine that they have just put under the ground. The 
message is, of course, that in the real world, we cannot put dangerous inventions underground 
again. While order is restored in Tom Poes and Bommel’s world, the real world is in big 
trouble, with no solution – no Tom Poes – in sight. Toonder was very pessimistic. In story 
after story he showed how power always corrupts, and that the immense power of modern 
technology is therefore a terrible danger. 
This pattern of the reassuring established order versus the frightening possibilities of 
modern technology is also visible in non-fiction-texts. One often repeated story about nuclear 
power was that it was new, yes, and frightening as well, but so was fire when it was first 
invented, and so was electricity. Electricity was used for lighting as well as for killing (the 
electric chair), and so it would be with nuclear power. Disney in his magnificent  propaganda 
film on nuclear power, ‘Our friend the atom,’ started with the famous story of the fisherman 
who unintentionally liberated a dangerous ghost from a bottle, but then succeeded in making 
the ghost serve him. Similar narratives were spun around automation and robots: robots are an 
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old story, some people said: there were moving statues in the ancient world, in the eighteenth 
century humanoid automatons were created, etc. The frighteningly new, these stories 
suggested, are not in fact so new, and will soon be domesticated, made part of the established 
order. Toonder exemplifies the approach taken by the more daring artists, who used their art 
to explore the possibility of disaster. Other examples of such unsettling work are the Swiss 
Dürrenmatt’s wonderful play Die Physiker (1963), and Kurt Vonnegut’s science fiction novel 
Cat’s cradle (1963).  
 
Next, consider the uses of metonymy.  
Here is an example from a Dutch magazine I studied intensively, Panorama. It is a series of 
pictures with captions, which appeared in 1950 under the title ‘Half a century of progress.’  
  
We see six pairs of photographs, each time comparing a scene from 1900 with one from 1950. 
The topics are medicine, flight, the automobile, radio and tv, modern housing, and weapons. 
The difference between the two pictures in each pair is labelled ‘progress.’ It is striking that 
all examples are of technology. Progress is here not associated with social legislation, for 
example, or with the increasing level of and participation in education.  
This is metonymy at work: twelve pictures of very specific objects represent a very 
general social process called progress. Not only is progress narrowed down to technologies, 
the technologies that are depicted also give a very specific idea of what technological progress 
is. The medical example, for example, shows the development from a powerless doctor at the 
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bedside of a sick patient to a patient enveloped in an iron lung, a machine that takes over the 
vital process of breathing: technology has really taken command here!  
 
 
One could read some of these pairs of pictures as highly ironic, even sarcastic comments on 
the idea of progress. Look at the progress of flight: from the Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk in 
North Carolina (1903) to a modern B 36 Convair bomber plane, made for carrying nuclear 
bombs, or from the machine gun to the atomic bomb.  
 
 
The reader might wonder: is this progress? However, was irony or sarcasm what the magazine 
intended? Did the editors want to depict progress as a mixed blessing, or even as a descent 
into destruction? There is no trace of irony in the captions, which only contain rather dry 
description. This is a problem we often encounter when studying pictures: interpretations may 
seem obvious, but are very difficult to prove. How should we deal with this? 
 
Excursus: Interpreting pictures.  
This is an important problem, for in the 20th century many messages went by image, not by 
text, or by a combination of the two. We need good instruments of analysis. But many 
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historians don’t worry much about this. They offer interpretations exhibiting their learned 
associations and some virtuosity in writing, but no real empirical support.23  
In searching for answers, I was disappointed with much of the literature about analysing 
pictures. Two authorities, one in cultural history, the other in history of photography, may 
serve as examples. P. Burke’s Eyewitnessing. The uses of images as historical evidence 
(Londen: Reaktion 2001) gives an overview of types of interpretation, questions to be 
considered, pitfalls to be avoided, and many wonderful examples. This is useful, but Burke 
does not provide the reader with very concrete guidelines or practical suggestions. According 
to a report of a conference where he spoke, his opinion is: ‘There are no rules in general. Each 
historian dealing with pictures has to determine and follow his or her own set of rules.’24 
Something similar is the case with Jens Jäger, Fotografie und Geschichte (Frankfurt a.M. 
Campus 2009). He too gives an overview of approaches to the analysis of pictures and he 
discusses the obvious questions (about authenticity, context, conventions, the importance of 
captions, etc), but does not leave you with a readily applicable and convincing method. 
I found some empirical sociological and historical studies much more useful and inspiring, 
for example Ibson’s chapter in E. Doss (ed), Looking at Life magazine (Washington 2001), 
which demonstrates an amazing change of views about masculinity during World War II; 
C.A. Lutz and E.A. Collins’ analysis of National Geographic (Chicago 1993), and a classic 
study by Erving Goffman, Gender advertisements (London 1979). The interpretive power of 
these works comes from their construction of long series of images around a certain theme, in 
Goffman’s book, for example, pictures of women and men laughing, or of families; and in 
Lutz and Collins images of white and coloured people looking at each other. Such series will 
reveal patterns of behaviour, as well as remarkable exceptions to those patterns. They may 
suggest, for example, power relations between men, women and children (in Goffman’s case), 
or between western and non-western people (in the Lutz/Collins book). They may also reveal 
recurrent oppositions, metaphors, and metonyms, as in my example of the Hiroshima pictures 
above (more examples soon). And such recurring patterns reflect, as we have learned from 
Bruner, patterns of thought and feeling. The patterns we find in series of images may lead us 
to formulate hypotheses, which we then can test against other evidence.  
Remember that pictures do not always simply illustrate. Sometimes there is a tension 
between the message of the text and the content of the accompanying picture, as in the 
23 example: Hales in Doss (ed), Looking at Life, o.c.. 
24 Tagungsbericht: The Pictorial Turn in History 04.04.2008-05.04.2008, London, report on the H-net. 
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example of progress and the bomber, above. Another example are medical applications of 
radiation, often cited during the 1950s as examples of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
counter-images to those of nuclear weapons. The pictures illustrating these articles could be 
rather frightening, demonstrating the deadly power of radiation and therefore suggesting fear 
rather than confidence.  
 
 
On the other hand, such images were also used to show that doctors were waging ‘a war on 
cancer’, which explains why they sometimes looked like armed aliens. It is often impossible 
to establish which meaning was intended by the editors, let alone how it was understood by 
readers. But recurrence of grim images of ‘the war on cancer’ certainly indicates one common 
way of looking at radiation, and at illness. In any case, always be careful in your formulations. 
I have read too many authors who claim that pictures in a magazine showed that ‘most 
people’ (in general) were ‘overwhelmed’, ‘puzzled’, etc., even though they can only show 
pictures, which if you look closely can be explained in different ways. Show these different 
ways, offer possible interpretations, using other sources for comparison: that way, you won’t 
impress the hasty reader, but you will invite the serious reader to think and argue with you. 
The pictures above also show that images may add a strong emotional content to the 
message. This is important, because so much in reactions to new technology is emotional 
rather than discursive. Historians tend to focus upon ideas, arguments, rational debate, 
‘discourse’, but much of the response to nuclear power and other new technologies is not 
articulated in that way. Images sometimes can show affective responses more clearly than 
texts, for example by depicting body language – which is also part of the symbol sphere. Here 
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is an example from the Dutch highbrow magazine Groene Amsterdammer in the summer of 
1957. It was a comment on an exhibition called ‘The Atom’ which was taking place at the 
time at Schiphol airport.  
 
 
The exhibition was meant to convince the Dutch public of the great future nuclear energy 
would bring and to make it stop worrying too much about nuclear weapons. The newspaper’s 
cartoonist depicted, we may hypothesize, the common reactions: not at all convinced, not 
overtly hostile either, but very suspicious, and women more so then men. This attitude would 
have been difficult to express in words, but in this picture it is crystal clear. If you read the 
picture in this way, and then look at reactions to the exhibition reported in newspapers, you 
will find this confirmed (it even looks a bit like the image of the citizens of Rommeldam in 
Toonder’s story, above). I found one very nice confirmation in a newspaper report on a public 
hearing of the municipal council of a small town, where the first Dutch nuclear reactor would 
be built. The journalist carefully described the body language of the councillors, listening to 
the nuclear experts extolling the beauties of nuclear energy. He said, for example, that they 
were sitting ‘dead silent and stiff.’ The dominating feeling was one of insecurity and fear, 
especially with regard to radiation, as well as distrust of the scientists (many famous 
scientists, such as Einstein, issued sharp warnings about radiation at the time, which 
undermined the optimistic message that many authorities propagated).  
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Body language is part of our daily conversations-without-words – one could even say not 
hindered by words. It relies on instant, instinctive understanding. It leaves few traces in 
written sources, although there are exceptions, such as the newspaper report I just cited, and 
descriptions in novels. But it is omnipresent, of course, in news photo’s, cartoons and comic 
stories. It expresses feelings and attitudes more than ideas. That is why these sources, difficult 
to explain as they are, are precious, and so are the serious attempts of scholars such as Lutz, 
Collins, Goffman and Ibson, cited above, to interpret them. 
The cartoon above suggests that women were much more, or more openly, sceptical about 
nuclear energy than men. Other evidence supports this. For example, according to several 
scholars, women were disproportionally active in the antinuclear movement.25  That brings 
me to the next picture, another example of metonymy. 
 
 
This picture, from Panorama, 1961, illustrates, believe it or not, the early antinuclear 
movement in Britain. The caption says that this is Mrs Oliver, arrested in London for her 
protests against nuclear tests. She is quoted as saying: ‘For my children I have now washed 
(laundered?) seven thousand diapers. I want to do at least as many again. But a nuclear war 
would end the lives of myself and the children whom I love.’ This is metonymy, on several 
levels. Most obviously, Mrs Oliver represents the women in the peace movement and their 
25 S.R. Weart, Nuclear fear. A history of images (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP 1988), 367; L. Wittner, The 
struggle against the bomb, vol 2, Resisting the bomb, 1954-1970 (Stanford: Stanford UP 1979), 464. 
                                                          
23 
 
most quoted motives: concern about their children. But the picture has a lot of additional 
symbolic power. Mrs Oliver, the diapers and the garden stand for the protection and 
cultivation of life, as opposed to the death force of nuclear weapons. These weapons are not 
depicted, but they are implied in the picture, and explicitly mentioned in the caption. In other 
words, the picture gives us an opposition of which we see only one side (I’ll come back to 
that). The image of life continuing is strong and comical here: while the garden grows, the 
babies will go on shitting, so the line of diapers will never end. The laundry line suggests 
continuity in time, but also fragility: it might all of a sudden be cut off. Thus, the picture tells 
a story, the familiar, reassuring one of birth and growth, and the possibility of sudden, 
massive death. 
Finally, you might say that the picture and the caption show a connection between two 
female roles that was new at the time. One is the familiar one of doing the laundry: female 
drudgery, elevated here to a symbol of life. The other role is the relative new one of political 
activism – radicalism even, for this lady was arrested. This is shortly before the second wave 
of feminism, and some authors have suggested that the antinuclear movement was one kind of 
preparation for that. But we cannot decide exactly what message was conveyed here: ‘here is 
a woman who has taken a strong political stand, but don’t worry: she is still a good housewife 
and mother’, or: ‘look at this nice housewife – but beware: she is also a radical.’ 
 
Oppositions 
The great anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss has made us aware that all stories are built up 
around oppositions. Hence, the main oppositions in a story reveal its structure. In the example 
I just gave, the ruling opposition is life against death, and these categories are connected with 
others: life is connected to babies and mothers, for example. The picture does not show the 
other side, death, but there is a strong suggestion that mothers, being closer to the basics of 
life, like babies and dirty diapers, have a better understanding of its value than men, who 
dominate science, technology, the military and so on.  
When you look at other representations of nuclear power, you find this female-male 
opposition everywhere. Here, for example, is the poster that advertised the Atom exhibition in 









Here, the atomic age that looks at us from the future is a pretty, smiling girl. More commonly, 




The exhibition also featured a very modern kitchen, and in the article in Panorama about it, 





Why was the atomic future feminized like this?  
There is an obvious answer: to soften the image of nuclear power, to domesticate it, associate 
it with female care. Perhaps the makers of the exhibition knew that resistance to nuclear 
power was particularly strong among women; or maybe they wanted to associate nuclear 
power with coseyness and homeliness in general. Such explanations sound plausible enough, 
but how could you substantiate them? 
To me, the first step is to realize that each and every image, statement and gesture about 
nuclear power – or whatever issue you choose to study – is part of a conversation, a dialogue, 
as Carey has taught us. If people use strong language or powerful images, it is because they 
feel strong opposition to their views. If women figure very prominently in atomic propaganda, 
there must be a gender issue. But that is only a hypothesis, that we have to test against other 
evidence. Since there is so much material for this period – think of newspapers and illustrated 
magazines alone! – this is not too difficult, only a lot of work. What can we learn from them 
about the gender issue? Here are some examples. 
One newspaper report on the exhibition was written from an explicitly female perspective, 
by a female journalist. She said that the exhibition was typically a men’s product, and very 
unattractive to women: the scientific explanations were too complicated and the atmosphere 
was cold.  If the organizers had tried to create or more woman-friendly atmosphere, they had 
failed miserably, according to this writer. 
At the end of 1949, when the Cold War was heating up – the Russians had just tested their 
first nuclear weapon – a theatre play toured the Netherlands, which received a very 
enthusiastic response. It told the story of an accident in a nuclear research facility in the US, 
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which is funded by the armed forces. The core of the story is a conflict between the professor 
who directs the institute and his son, who also works at the plant as a scientist. The professor 
has discovered an explosive more powerful than plutonium. The son wants to keep the 
material out of the hands of the government, but the father says that the government has a 
right to the results for which it has paid. When the reactor malfunctions and is about to 
explode, the son saves the facility, but receives a lethal dose of radiation. As he lies dying, the 
professor changes his mind, and refuses hand over his report.  
Gender is an important sub-theme here. The professor has a housemaid, and elderly 
woman, who has more or less taken the place of his deceased wife. She says that since the 
professor has started to work for the military, the mood in the house has changed: military 
bigwigs walk in and out, there is an atmosphere of secrecy and nervousness, and the professor 
has become short-tempered and sleepless. The accident, she says, is the result of this, and the 
whole project is a crime. Her voice is one of human feeling and common sense, against a 
world of men gone mad. It is striking that the antinuclear movement that started about eight 
years later had features that were similar to this play of 1949: a strong presence of youth and 
women, who turned against the military-academic-industrial establishment. 
This theatre play was very helpful in my research, because it literally presented a 
conversation about nuclear power, although in fictional form. It summarized a wide range of 
arguments, connected with different social and generational attitudes and emotions.  
While the play showed different sides of the dialogue, many sources exhibit only one side, 
as my final example shows. Leonard de Vries was the most popular popularizer of science 
and technology during the 1950s and 60s. He had written widely read books about electricity 
and radio, for an adolescent audience. For the atom exhibition, he wrote a book about nuclear 
power, and at the exhibition he gave public lectures. It would be an understatement to say that 
De Vries was a technology enthusiast – he was nothing less than a rhapsodist of technology, a 
lyrical lover. In his novels for young people he wrote about the almost ecstatic enjoyment of 





At first, this seems puzzling, because the mood among most intellectuals in the 
Netherlands was pessimistic during the fifties. They spoke of a cultural crisis, and blamed 
technology for much of this crisis (there is no time to go into this here, but they were thinking 
of increasing materialism, the rise of a technocracy, the decline of religion and idealism and 
so on – Dekker’s play was a fictional expression of this type of criticism). So how does De 
Vries fit into this picture? For one thing, he was outside the circles of the intellectuals and 
spoke to a different group of people – such as the high school boys that were the main 
characters in his stories. He did not write in newspapers and intellectual journals. Yet, he was 
in dialogue with the pessimists, in two ways. First, you can read his works as a point-by-point 
refutation of the common pessimism: technology is the motor of industrial development and 
national wealth; it does not reduce people to cogs in machines and it does not create deadly 
routines, but invites participation in technological discovery and inspires enthusiasm in 
cooperative technical work. But what makes him especially interesting to me is not so much 
his arguments, which were advanced by others as well, but the emotional quality of his work: 
the sheer joy of technological creation that he described and, in view of his large audience, 
succeeded in conveying to his readers. His work demonstrates, again, that we must pay a lot 
of attention to feeling when we study reactions to technology. 
 
Concluding remarks  
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The interpretive scheme suggested here is a simple one, certainly when compared to the very 
sophisticated analyses of semiologists and narrative analysis.26 Those analyses often focus on 
one or a few sources. We historians cannot afford to do that: we usually study a large amount 
of very heterogeneous source material. We always have to balance depth and scope of 
analysis, and the scheme described here is my answer to that unsolvable problem. 
 Still, the amount of source material to be analysed for this type of research is huge. 
But it has its limits too, for the number of basic stories circulating in a society is limited. Of 
course there are endless variations. But basic oppositions, metaphors (‘crossroads,’ ‘war on 
cancer’) are repeated endlessly, and the point may come sooner than you think when you start 
seeing the same pattern of thinking again and again. The challenge then becomes: when does 
this pattern start to change? And why? 
Implicit in my approach is the notion that ideas are not locked up in a social group or 
in a nation – not even in higher order units such as ‘western culture.’ They circulate, take on 
different forms in different media. For cultural analysis, therefore, I find it more fruitful to 
think in terms of society as a conversation than as a structure of classes, organizations and so 
on, each with its own set of ideas and attitudes. I think people participate in communication 
circuits of different kinds and ranges. For many people and for long periods of time these 
were rather narrow, and there was great intellectual authority in, say, the local priest. But in 
the period I am studying, the decades after World War II, people increasingly participated in 
several circuits – radio and television for example, in addition to their local community or 
church. Some people, such as modern architects, participated in international circuits like the 
CIAM, that were more important for the development of their ideas than national or local 
ones. This idea of communication circuits needs elaboration, of course. This lecture has 
focused on the basic structures in messages involving modern technology and how they 
interact in a continuous conversation.  
26 Nice examples in Fiske o.c. and in John Storey, Cultural studies and the study of popular culture (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 2010, 3d ed). 
                                                          
